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Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to take a closer look at both the 
philosophical and religious presumptions upon which the medieval concept of 
curiosity was premised. Such an enterprise needs to go back to Aristotle in 
order to fully comprehend the limitations for curiosity introduced by St. 
Augustine in his City of God and developed by such medieval thinkers as Isidore 
of Seville and Thomas of Aquinas. These conceptions will be analysed in 
reference to Foucauldian archeology of knowledge. Much attention should be 
paid to the ideas of curiositas, admiratio and studiositas. 
 
Resumo: o foco principal deste artigo é o de olhar mais atentamente as 
presunções filosóficas e religiosas nas quais o conceito medieval de curiosidade 
era gestado. Tal intento deve recuar a Aristóteles de maneira a compreender 
completamente as limitações acerca da curiosidade como introduzida por 
Santo Agostinho e desenvolvida por pensadores medievais, como Isidoro de 
Sevilha e Tomas de Aquino. Estas concepções serão analisadas tendo como 
referencia a Arqueologia do Saber Foucaultiana. Muita atenção deve ser 
prestada para as ideias de curiositas, admiratio e studiositas. 
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Introduction 
 
The cultural history of curiosity in globally perceived European culture still 
has not been written and it may be considered a significant lacuna in the field 
of intellectual history. It is reflected in the fact that New Dictionary of the History 
of Ideas does not even include an individual entry for curiosity.2 The 
importance of this idea, however, was taken into account in several works 
which address the notion of curiosity in the early modern period, for instance 
with regard to the scientific revolution or early modern European cabinet 
collections.3 Nonetheless, there is a lack of influential studies in the long 
history of this multifaceted idea from antiquity to the modern period. In the 
face of an increased interest in studies in representations of otherness and 
monstrosity in European culture, this article aims to rethink the question of 
curiosity in medieval thought with reference to the proclaimed vision of reality 
and Foucault’s concept of the order of things. 
 
I will leave aside the notion of curiosity as understood in terms of scientific 
inquisitiveness and a pursuit for knowledge believed to be objective. Instead, I 
will focus on the sense of attraction to the various obscurities of human 
experience, which do not need to be involved in rational examination, but – 
on the contrary – tend to employ the power of the imagination and remain 
closer to the anthropology of experience. 
 
 
                                                          
2 WIENER, Philip P. (ed.). Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. 
(1973-1974). HOROWITZ, Maryanne Cline (ed.). New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. New 
York: Charles Scribners & Sons 2004. Neither edition lists curiosity. 
3 See the works on curiosity in early modern (and modern) science: BALL, Philip. Curiosity. 
How Science Became Interested in Everything? Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013. See also 
BENEDICT, Barbara B. Curiosity. A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2002; KENNY, Neil. Curiosity in Early Modern Europe. Word 
Histories. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998; POMIAN, Krzysztof. Collectors and 
Curiosities. Paris and Venice 1500–1800, WILES-PORTER, E. (trans.). Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990; EVANS, R. J. W and MARR, A. (eds.). Curiosity and Wonders from the Renaissance 
to the Enlightenment. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.  
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Curiosity – a Virtue or a Vice?  
 
Let us begin with the unhesitating evaluation of curiosity that Michel de 
Montaigne included in his celebrated essay Apology for Raymond Sebond: 
 
Christians have special knowledge of the extent to which curiosity is a natural 
and evil in man. The desire to increase in wisdom and in knowledge: that was 
the first ruin of mankind. That is the path by which it hurled itself into eternal 
damnation.4  
 
Although we may trace some gnostic influences on the sceptical notion in the 
assertion that knowledge is the ruin of mankind, which would remain vivid in 
the European non-dogmatic thought into the twentieth century, to name Lev 
Shestov as one example among others, Michel de Montaigne pointed out the 
crucial threat that had been well recognised in the medieval Christian tradition 
of philosophy. That is, that on one hand curiosity is defined as natural, but on 
the other is perceived as evil, though it may be believed that nature shall make 
no mistakes. 
 
This tricky ambivalence had been encountered by many thinkers before him 
and consists in the question, how does one legitimately condemn something 
that seems so anthropologically natural for the human imagination, and for 
cognition itself? Ultimately it led medieval philosophers to the discursive 
challenge of conceptualising curiosity as a vice in regard to the sensual 
pleasure. 
 
Let us go back for a brief moment to ancient thought, which preconditioned 
the Christian epistemological horizon to the greatest extent. Among several 
substantial statements we may consider the adage attributed to Socrates: “quae 
supra nos, nihil ad nos,” which bonded mankind to their epistemological horizon 
and gained strongly in importance with the onset of the Reformation. As 
Carlo Ginzburg noted in reference to Erasmus: 
 
It is true that the theological disputes between Catholic and Protestant 
following the onset of the Reformation elicited from Erasmus, more and more 
often, the quotation of an old dictum: "Quae supra nos, ea nihil ad nos (we have 
not to care about things which are above us)". He was not returning, of course, 
to the tradition of monastic intellectual humility. The dictum itself, ascribed to 
                                                          
4 MONTAIGNE, Michel de. Apology for Raymond Sebond, ARIEW, R. and GRENE, M. 
(trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003, p. 59.  
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Socrates, expressed a different feeling. With true Socratic irony, Erasmus 
ambiguously referred to the limits of human knowledge […].5 
 
Prometheus and Icarus are often thought to be the two mythological 
archetypes who were punished for their curiosity and for overstepping the 
borders of human condition in discordance with the dictum “quae supra nos, 
nihil ad nos.” Probably the most renowned literary work that deals with not 
only magic and the forbidden sphere, but also with what is sacred and 
inaccessible is Apuleius’ Metamorphoses or The Golden Ass (second century AD). 
 
These works had great an influence on Augustine of Hippo, who as the 
author of Confessions, made a significant attempt to link curiosity, as a sort of 
longing in the soul, with sins of the flesh in accordance with the First Epistle 
of John, which reads: 
 
For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and 
the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world.6 
 
Let us take a closer look at the whole of Augustine’s passage on this: 
 
Besides this there is yet another form of temptation still more complex in its 
peril. For in addition to the fleshly appetite which strives for the gratification 
of all senses and pleasures--in which its slaves perish because they separate 
themselves from thee--there is also a certain vain and curious longing in the 
soul, rooted in the same bodily senses, which is cloaked under the name of 
knowledge and learning; not having pleasure in the flesh, but striving for new 
experiences through the flesh. This longing--since its origin is our appetite for 
learning, and since the sight is the chief of our senses in the acquisition of 
knowledge--is called in the divine language “the lust of the eyes.” 7  
 
Curiositas is defined as rooted in human anima, but is pursued through the 
senses, as there is no legitimate possibility of the transcendental pursuit for 
this kind of knowledge without any connection to the flesh, namely to the 
sense of sight. Whereas the search for the eternal truth of God and nature is 
believed not to be mediated by sensual experience and curiosity, therefore, is 
doomed to fail the prerogatives of pure reason, as it needs to be proven by the 
                                                          
5 GINZBURG, Carlo. ‘High and Low: The Theme of Forbidden Knowledge in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’. In: Past & Present, 73, 1976, pp. 28-41 (p. 33). 
6 1 John 2. 16. 
7 ST. AUGUSTINE. Confessions, OUTLER, A. C. (trans.). New York: Barnes & Noble 
2007, X. 35, 54. 
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eye. But thereafter, the connection between curious sight and sinful pleasure 
does not remain obvious from Augustine’s point of view. In another passage 
he declares: 
 
[…] one can the more clearly distinguish whether it is pleasure or curiosity that 
is being pursued by the senses. For pleasure pursues objects that are beautiful, 
melodious, fragrant, savory, soft. But curiosity, seeking new experiences, will 
even seek out the contrary of these, not with the purpose of experiencing the 
discomfort that often accompanies them, but out of a passion for 
experimenting and knowledge. For what pleasure is there in the sight of a 
lacerated corpse, which makes you shudder? And yet if there is one lying close 
by we flock to it, as if to be made sad and pale. People fear lest they should see 
such a thing even in sleep, just as they would if, when awake, someone 
compelled them to go and see it or if some rumor of its beauty had attracted 
them.8  
 
In this instance, both pleasure and curiosity are pursued by the senses. 
However, Augustine takes into account the ability to distinguish one from 
another insofar as experiences gained by curiosity do not bring the sense of 
comfort, which is considered the major target of pleasure. 
 
From the modern perspective it may be assumed that the philosopher only 
intuitively detects the convergence between pleasure resulting from sensual 
contemplation of beauty and sensual attraction to rareness, uncanniness and 
obscurity, whereas the latter have nothing in common with the traditional 
canon of measure and proportion believed to underlie the perception of 
beauty. Rational reflection, however, does not allow Augustine to consider the 
feeling of shuddering, caused by the ‘sight of a lacerated corpse’, pleasant. 
 
Contemporary psychoanalytical tools give an answer to Augustine’s doubts by 
pointing out the concept of the abject, i.e. ‘the twisted braid of affects and 
thoughts’ with no ‘definable object’, which is – generally speaking – at the same 
time both appealing and disgusting.9 At this point, having followed an 
axiological distinction between purity of reason and impurity of senses, 
Augustine faces the same challenge upon which Plato’s idealism was 
premised. As Julia Kristeva claims: 
                                                          
8 Ibid., X. 35, 55. 
9 KRISTEVA, Julia. Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection, ROUDIEZ, L. S. (trans.). New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 1.  
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The analyst is thus and forever sent back to the question that already haunted 
Plato when he wanted to take over where Apollonian or Dionysiac religion left 
off. Purification is something only the Logos is capable of. But is that to be 
done in the manner of the Phaedo, stoically separating oneself from a body 
whose substance and passions are sources of impurity? Or rather, as in the 
Sophist, after having sorted out the worst from the best; or after the fashion of 
the Philebus by leaving the doors wide open to impurity, provided the eyes of 
the mind remain focused on truth? In such a case, pleasure, having become 
pure and true through the harmony of color and form as in the case of 
accurate and beautiful geometric form, has nothing in common, as the 
philosopher says, with ‘the pleasures of scratching.10  
 
In Philebus Socrates argued that ‘true’ pleasures, elicited from the beauty of 
figures, straightness, roundness, smoothness, and clearness of sounds, are to 
be understood in objective terms: 
 
Things like that, I maintain, are beautiful not, as most things, in a relative 
sense; they are always beautiful in their own nature, and they carry pleasures 
peculiar to themselves, which are quite unlike the pleasures of scratching.11  
 
Augustine clearly adopted Plato’s assertion of beautiful things being beautiful 
in themselves, making his hesitant assessment of ‘shuddering’ comparable to 
Socrates’ ‘pleasures of scratching’. Even if modern theory was to be set aside, 
Augustine’s arguments would still appear not to be congruent. As long as 
curiosity does not bring pleasure comparable to that caused by beauty, its 
definition switches to a kind of passion for experimenting and gaining 
knowledge. Already Socrates in the same passage of Philebus discussed ‘the 
pleasures of learning’: 
 
Now let us proceed to add to them the pleasures of learning, if we in fact think 
that they involve no hunger, that no initial distress is felt owing to a hunger for 
learning.12  
 
Both Augustine’s and Plato’s understanding of the passion to learn seem 
rather to contribute to the meaning of the later term studiositas, or intellectual 
inquisitiveness, which was explicitly opposed to evil curiosity in a similar 
fashion by Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, studiousness can be 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 27. The reference to Plato can be found in Philebus 51. 
11 PLATO. Philebus, HACKWORTH, R. (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1972, 51 C. 
12 Ibid., 52. 
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regarded as virtuous, provided that it is employed for the sake of knowledge 
of intelligible truths. As it is claimed in his Summa Theologica: 
 
[…] if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason 
of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible 
truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.13  
 
By virtue of Aquinas’ positive evaluation of virtuous inquisitiveness, the 
pleasure of sight could be replaced by the pleasure of cognition despite the 
discomfort caused by the experience. However, Augustine does not easily 
follow this reasoning. By arguing “Yet if there is one lying close by we flock to 
it, as if to be made sad and pale” the author clearly refers to the everyday 
experience and does not treat it as the pursuit for knowledge, but as a sort of 
appealing attraction, which – as we can nowadays be certain of – does not 
consist in seeking for measure and proportion. Augustine’s observation can be 
considered the first step in conceptualising interest in performing uncanniness 
and monstrosity, which in the later Middle Ages and most notably in the 
sixteenth century drew crowds at local fairs. The spectacle of sight is 
intuitively meant to bring pleasure despite or even because of the breaking of the 
rules of canonical beauty, which hitherto had been perceived as natural, by 
performing the liminal space between the human and the non-human. 
 
Out of a number of sixteenth and seventeenth century literary witnesses to 
these social practices, one can point out two examples by such great minds as 
Michel de Montaigne and William Shakespeare, who refer to the peculiar 
pleasure that sprang from experiencing the spectacle of monstrosity or ethnic 
otherness. In the essay Of a Monstrous Child, the French philosopher describes 
interest in the physical deformation of the body, which offers the opportunity 
to earn some money owing to human non-rational curiosity. As Montaigne 
recounts it: 
 
Two days ago I saw a child that two men and a nurse, who said they were the 
father, the uncle, and the aunt of it, carried about to get money by showing it, 
by reason it was so strange a creature.14  
                                                          
13 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN 
PROVINCE (trans.). New York, Benziger Bros. 1947, II-II, Q. 167, Art. 2. 
14 MONTAIGNE, Michel de. The Complete Essays, FRAME, D. M. (trans.). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 538.  
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In The Tempest, Shakespeare included a highly noteworthy observation directly 
referring to the spectacle of viewing a dead, non-European body: 
 
Any strange beast there makes a man. When they will not give a doit to relieve 
a lame beggar, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian.15 
 
It was this sort of curiosity, which has nothing in common with virtuous 
studiousness, but can be understood as attraction to strange sights, that 
Augustine detected. Having embraced the broader context by going beyond 
the boundaries of human nature and cognition, Augustine’s recapitulation of 
the question brings to mind the moral of The Golden Ass:16 
 
This malady of curiosity is the reason for all those strange sights exhibited in 
the theater. It is also the reason why we proceed to search out the secret 
powers of nature--those which have nothing to do with our destiny—which do 
not profit us to know about, and concerning which men desire to know only 
for the sake of knowing. And it is with this same motive of perverted curiosity 
for knowledge that we consult the magical arts.17  
 
Curiosity in Daily Experience and ‘The Order of Things’  
 
Much has already been written on various understandings of the idea of 
curiosity in Augustinian thought, however, there is still plenty to be said on 
the passages that deal with the quotidian experience of curiosity and how that 
is reconciled with anthropological notions. For example, the last quotation 
from Confessions poses an intriguing question: 
 
How is it that when I am sitting at home a lizard catching flies, or a spider 
entangling them as they fly into her webs, oftentimes arrests me? Is the feeling 
of curiosity not the same just because these are such tiny creatures? From them 
I proceed to praise thee, the wonderful Creator and Disposer of all things; but 
it is not this that first attracts my attention.18. 
                                                          
15 SHAKESPEARE, William. The Tempest. London: Penguin Books, 2001, II. 2. 31–33.  
16 In Confessions, Augustine tends to repeat the phrase sacrilega curiositas, extracted from 
Apuleius, and claims it to for himself, confessing that after the arrival in Carthage he 
followed ‘sacrilega curiositas’, which may be understood as self-identification with fictional 
Lucius. See WALSH, P. G. ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Curiosity’. Greece & Rome. Second 
Series, 35, 1988, pp. 73-85 (p. 82).  
17 ST. AUGUSTINE. Confessions, OUTLER, A. C. (trans.). New York: Barnes & Noble 
2007, X. 35, 55. 
18 Ibid., X. 35, 37. 
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While reflecting on his own experience, Augustine points out that curiosity – 
somehow naturally – precedes the reflection upon divine creation. He 
honestly confesses that it is not the idea of God that draws his attention to 
numerous obscurities encountered in daily life in the first place. Having 
recognised this, Augustine, still attempts to embrace any such observation as 
part of religious praise. As a consequence, one can feel encouraged to ask 
about the order of things, which prompts this speculative movement from the 
real object to the supernatural meaning. 
 
In this turning point from pagan philosophy to medieval Christian thought, 
Augustine suggests the direction which medieval allegorisation would follow. 
Curiosities observed by the sight should be deprived of their sensual 
appearances in order to link earthly reality with divine meanings. It is obvious 
that Augustine in his treatises, most notably in De civitate Dei, put great effort 
into translating various phenomena into the language of religious allegory, 
such as in the case of his etymology of monsters, which he defined as portenta 
and ostenta. 
 
But from the perspective of the anthropology of experience it is very 
interesting how the author seems to indicate the same relation, while ‘sitting at 
home’ and getting attracted to some intriguing sight, such as ‘a lizard catching 
flies’. 
 
Some scholars have argued that the examination of curiositas by Augustine was 
primarily concerned with epistemology, while the moral implications of his 
analysis of curiosity were of secondary importance. However, reflecting on the 
order of things allows us to assume that these two dimensions were actually 
inseparable components in his broad-based vision of reality. To elaborate this 
one needs to revisit Aristotle, who appreciated curiosity within the semantics 
of admiratio. In his Metaphysics Aristotle claimed: 
 
For it is owing to their wonder [το θαυμάζειν] that men both now begin and at 
first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, 
then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters.19 
 
το θαυμάζειν is linked to Greek words ‘theorein’ (θεορειν) and ‘theatron’ 
(θέατρον), both derived from the verb theasthai (θέασθαι), which means ‘to 
                                                          
19 ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics. In: The Works of Aristotle, ROSS, W. D. (trans.). Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1991, I, I. 2.  
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see’ or ‘to look’. This etymology is also reflected in the Latin words ‘mirare’ 
and ‘admiratio’. 
 
Still it remains open to doubt whether Aristotle’s viewpoint was praising 
wonderment for its own sake. Thauma resulted from the lack of understanding 
and it may be claimed that the significance of wonderment consists in 
preceding the progress of knowledge only. The attainment of knowledge is 
regarded as one-way movement from obscuritas to claritas, whereas it is rather 
the rational explanation of difficulties that brings true pleasure of 
understanding. 
 
Thus thauma could be semantically referring to ‘puzzlement’ indicating a sort 
of confusion. There is neither anything wonderful nor admirable in Aristotle’s 
wonderment. Once rational causes have been explained, there remains no 
room for curiosity, which is replaced by purely intellectual contemplation of 
the order of things. Thauma only prompts the search for reasons, which are 
embraced in philosophy within the major concept of Nature. In his Exortation 
to Philosophy Aristotle claimed: 
 
But everyone would agree that intelligence comes from learning or from 
searching, the capacities for which are comprehended within philosophy. 
Hence surely we have to do philosophy unreservedly.20 
 
In this passage Aristotle considers the act of searching as the starting point for 
philosophy, which leads to a conviction that the initiating thauma ought to be 
reserved for elaborating on rational knowledge and putting effort into 
understanding, not wondering, whereas philosophy ought to be ‘done 
unreservedly’. Such a vision is only possible by virtue of the holistic concept 
of Nature. In another passage there is a claim that it is only philosophy itself 
which offers full accordance with the rules of Nature: 
 
If, then, only that kind of knowledge which does have correctness of 
judgment, and does use reason, and observes the good as a whole -- 
that is to say, philosophy -- is capable of using everything and issuing orders in 
accordance with nature, by all means one ought to do philosophy, since 
                                                          
20 ARISTOTLE. Protrepticus or Exortation to Philosophy, HUTCHINSON, D. S. and 
JOHNSON, Monte Ransom (eds. and trans.). San Diego: Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p. 17. 
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only philosophy includes within itself this correct judgment and this 
intelligence to issue orders without errors.21 
 
Once wonderment has been restrained, the realm of philosophy is being 
opened and embraced in the holistic structure of Nature both within the 
epistemological and moral dimension. Let us recall Foucault’s unhesitant claim 
at the beginning of his renowned chapter on ‘the four similitudes’, which had 
been shaping ‘the prose of the world’: 
 
Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role 
in the knowledge of Western culture. It was resemblance that largely guided 
exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it was resemblance that organized the 
play of the symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, 
and controlled the art of representing them.22  
 
With reference to this Foucauldian concept, one can argue that the above-
mentioned holistic structure of Nature is premised upon the major 
resemblance, superordinate to the four similitudes, namely the resemblance 
between human reason and Nature itself. Early Christian thinkers succeeded 
in reconciling the ancient vision of the universe with the concept of divine 
creation. Although Tertullian may be called – according to Arthur Lovejoy at 
least – an epistemological primitivist, and ‘anti-intellectualist’ who explicitly 
tried to divide Jerusalem from Athens, his concept of nature as the norm was 
founded, to a great extent, upon the Greek one.23 
 
From Tertullian’s point of view Nature means ‘universality, primevality and 
simplicity’, whereas human anima is the faculty responsible for apprehending 
transcendental meanings and making man ‘a rational animal in the highest 
degree capable of thought and knowledge.24 Lovejoy justly points out that 
despite Tertullian’s anti-intellectualism and hostility towards Greek philosophy 
Tertullian ‘appears less an Early Father of the Latin Church than an Early 
Father of the deism’. For Tertullian, natural truths, including the idea of God 
as Creator, do not demand any kind of revelation, but are attainable due to the 
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 42. 
22 FOUCAULT, Michel. The Order of Things. An Archaeology of Human Sciences, SHERIDAN, 
A. (trans.). New York: Vintage Books, 1994, p. 17.  
23 LOVEJOY, Arthur Oncken. ‘‘Nature’ as Norm in Tertullian’. In: Essays in the History of 
Ideas. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960, pp. 308-38 (p. 315).  
24 TERTULLIAN. De Testimonio animae 1. See also LOVEJOY, pp. 308-09. 
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universal anima, a concept in early modern times known as la lumière naturelle.25 
Tertullian elaborated upon the philosophical prerogative of reason as the 
faculty most closely resembling that of divine Nature, which then 
preconditioned and preceded a further play on words and things by virtue of 
the figures of similitude. 
 
Allegorical ways of reading the textual world were already conspicuously 
noticeable in Augustine’s interpretation of the monstrous, whether defined as 
‘miraculum’, ‘portentum’, or ‘ostentus’. While Pliny the Elder’s writings on 
monstrous races featured curiosity at least to some extent, Augustine, 
however, does not see otherness as contrary to nature but rather as contrary 
to our understanding of nature: 
 
We commonly say, of course, that all portents are contrary to nature, but in 
fact they are not… For how can anything done by the will of God be contrary 
to nature, when the will of so great a creator constitutes the nature of each 
created thing? 26 
 
Insofar as natural creation is regarded as good, coherent, repetitive, and 
accepting no exceptions or hazards, each kind of otherness preserves its 
position in the rational order of things. Although it may seem to be uncanny, 
extraordinary, or obscure to human reason, it still takes part in divine creation 
and demands no further, curious inquiry. 
 
Isidore of Seville, who created the major medieval work encouraging so many 
curious questions, and having relied upon the power of imagination in his 
search for the accordance between words and things, nonetheless severely 
condemned curiosity on the same grounds: 
 
Have no curiosity for those things which lie hidden. Abstain from seeking out 
those which are far and distant from human senses. Leave to one side, like a 
secret, anything which the Holy Scriptures has not caused you to learn. Seek 
not beyond that which is written, question not the holy teachings. Do not 
desire to know that which is forbidden to know. Curiosity is a dangerous 
                                                          
25 LOVEJOY. ‘‘Nature’ as Norm in Tertullian’, p. 315.  
26 ST. AUGUSTINE. The City of God, GREEN, W. M. (trans.). London: Heinemann, 1965, 
21.6, 8. See also FRIEDMAN, John Block. The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought. 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000, p. 120. 
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presumption. Curiosity is a harmful science. It leads to heresy. It embroils the 
mind in sacrilegious fables.27  
 
The phrase ‘sacrilegious fables’ is clearly derived from the Augustinian phrase 
‘sacrilega curiositas’, which Augustine was so attracted to in his reading of 
Apuleius. Isidore was able to condemn curiosity insofar as it recreates objects 
of cognition outside the order of things. In the passage on the portents, he 
actually repeats Augustine’s rational explanation of the otherness: 
 
De portentis. Varro defines portents as beings that seem to have been born 
contrary to nature – but they are not contrary to nature, because they are 
created by divine will, since the nature of everything is the will of the Creator. 
Whence even the pagans address God sometimes as ‘Nature’, sometimes as 
‘God’. A portent is therefore not created contrary to nature, but contrary to 
what is known nature. Portents are also called signs, omens, and prodigies, 
because they are seen to portend and display, indicate and predict.28… 
[Etymologiae XI. iii 1-2] 
 
Isidore sets up the perception and discovery of the etymological accordance 
between words and things as a Christian goal, which in turn contributes to the 
universal, consistent meaning of the reality. The latest successors to this 
thought – or at least one of the greatest – was again Michel de Montaigne: 
 
Those that we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity of 
His work the infinite forms that He has comprehended therein; and it is to be 
believed that this figure which astonishes us has relation to some other figure 
of the same kind unknown to man. From His all wisdom nothing but good, 
common; and regular proceeds; but we do not discern the disposition and 
relation […]. Whatever falls out contrary to custom we say is contrary to 
nature, but nothing, whatever it be, is contrary to her. Let, therefore, this 
universal and natural reason expel the error and astonishment that novelty 
brings along with it.29  
 
Although Montaigne’s philosophy was, in so many ways novel to Renaissance 
Europe, his rational vision of the world went together with medieval stifling 
                                                          
27 See MARTIN, David L. Curious visions of modernity. Enchantment, Magic, and the Sacred. 
Cambridge: MIT Press 2011, p. 35.  
28 ISIDORE OF SEVILLE. The Etymologies, BARNEY, S. A. et al (trans.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, XI. 3. 1-2.  
29 MONTAIGNE, Michel de. The Complete Essays, FRAME, D. M. (trans.). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 539. 
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of curiosity towards the monstrous and imaginary otherness. Montaigne’s 
astonishment resembles the Aristotelian thauma, which still needs to be 
expelled on the grounds of universal and natural reason. For as long as one is 
capable of explaining rationally the position of things in the universal order, 
there is no justified reason for astonishment.  
 
Summary  
 
In this essay an attempt has been made to argue that curiosity in pre-modern 
Europe should be rethought in terms of a Foucauldian archaeology of 
knowledge, which allows a much deeper insight into intellectual history and 
reinforces the extent to which the evaluation of curiosity resulted from the 
universal notion of Nature. Therefore, what used to be understood as an 
enhancement of curiosity’s value in early modern science as well as in 
mannerist and baroque poetics, ought to be considered instead as being 
premised upon the novel concept of reality and knowledge, namely the novel 
order of things, which Foucault dates back to the late sixteenth century.  
 
